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A competitive game whose maximal Nash-equilibrium payoff requires quantum
resources for its achievement
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While it is known that shared quantum entanglement can offer improved solutions to a number of
purely cooperative tasks for groups of remote agents, controversy remains regarding the legitimacy
of quantum games in a competitive setting—in particular, whether they offer any advantage beyond
what is achievable using classical resources. We construct a competitive game between four players
based on the minority game where the maximal Nash-equilibrium payoff when played with the
appropriate quantum resource is greater than that obtainable by classical means, assuming a local
hidden variable model. The game is constructed in a manner analogous to a Bell inequality. This
result is important in confirming the legitimacy of quantum games.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le
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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a branch of mathematics dealing with
strategic interactions of competitive agents where the
outcome is contingent upon the combined actions of the
agents. In 1999, game theory was formally extended into
the quantum realm by replacing the classical informa-
tion with qubits and the player actions by quantum op-
erators [1, 2]. Since then much work has been done in
the new discipline of quantum game theory [3, 4] and
attempts have been made to put it on a more formal
footing [5]. There have been objections that quantum
games are not truly quantum mechanical and have little
to do with the underlying classical games [6, 7, 8]. How-
ever, attempts have been made to counter these argu-
ments [9]. In addition, quantum games have been shown
to be more efficient than classical games, in terms of in-
formation transfer, and that finite classical games are a
proper subset of quantum games [10], thus demonstrating
that not all quantum games can be reduced to classical
ones. Quantum game protocols have also been proposed
that use the non-local features of quantum mechanics
which have no classical analogue [11, 12].
In the present work we construct a game that is a min-
imal quantum generalization of a possible classical game
and that has a Nash equilibrium that is not achievable
by any classical hidden variable model. Our model is
distinguished by its competitive nature from situations,
also referred to in the literature as quantum games, that
involve a number of agents solving a cooperative task by
quantum means [13, 14].
The minority game was introduced in 1997 [15] as a
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simple multi-agent model that is able to reproduce much
of the behaviour of financial markets. The agents inde-
pendently select one of two choices (‘buy’ or ‘sell’) and
those in the minority win, the idea being that when ev-
eryone is buying prices are inflated and it is best to be
a seller and vice versa. In a one-shot minority game
the best players can do is to select among the alterna-
tives at random with an unbiased coin. The simplest
non-trivial situation is the four player game: only one
player can win; however, there is a fifty percent chance
that there is no minority, in which case all players re-
ceive zero payoff. Versions of the minority game utiliz-
ing quantum resources have attracted attention since the
probability of the no-minority case can be eliminated in
the four player game [16], or reduced for even N > 4 [17].
These result are robust even in the presence of decoher-
ence [18]. In addition, utilizing a particular set of tun-
able four-party entangled states as the quantum resource
shared by the players, there is an equivalence between
the optimal game payoffs and the maximal violation of
the four-party MABK-type Bell inequality [19, 20, 21] for
the initial state [22].
In the quantum minority game each player receives one
qubit from a known entangled state. They can act on
their qubit with a local unitary operator, the choice of
which is their strategy. The qubits are then measured in
the computational basis, and payoffs are awarded as in
the classical game. Starting with the GHZ state (|0000〉+
|1111〉)/√2, if each player operates with
sˆ =
1√
2
(
eipi/8 ie−ipi/8
ieipi/8 e−ipi/8
)
, (1)
the resulting superposition contains only those states
where one of the four player is in the minority and so
the average payoff 〈$〉 is 1
4
, compared with 1
8
for the clas-
sical game [16]. When all players use this strategy the
result is a Nash equilibrium, a strategy profile from which
2no player can improve their payoff by a unilateral change
in strategy. The result is also Pareto optimal, one from
which no player can improve their payoff without some-
one else being worse off.
One complaint, however, that can be leveled at the
quantum versions is that the same outcome can be
achieved by a purely classical local hidden variable
model. For example, in a four-player minority game a
trusted third party could choose one of the eight classi-
cal messages 0001, 0010, 0100, 1000, 1110, 1101, 1011, or
0111 at random and then inform each of the players of
their selected value. None of the players has an incentive
to vary their choice, and the expected payoff is fair to all
players. Such an arrangement would also yield 〈$〉 = 1
4
.
In this paper we introduce a competitive game having
a Nash-equilibrium maximal payoff that requires the use
of quantum resources. In other words, this payoff cannot
be achieved by players who only have access to classical
resources (i.e., resources whose statistical properties can
be modeled using local hidden variables). This is in con-
trast to previous work on cooperative games such as the
XOR game, odd cycle game, and magic square game [13]:
even though those games were also shown to be equiva-
lent to a corresponding Tsirelson-type inequality and can
be used to demonstrate a Bell inequality, the critical dis-
tinction is that the game we consider has a competitive
aspect, and it is therefore essential to consider the Nash
equilibrium.
II. DEFINITION OF THE GAME
We now define the game that is the subject of this
paper. This four-player game will be based partly on
the minority game and partly on what we call the anti-
minority game. While the minority game provides a pay-
off of 1 for the player who answers differently from the
other three (if there is exactly one such player) and no
payoff to any other player, the anti-minority game re-
wards the case where there is no minority, providing a
payoff of 1
4
to all players when all players give the same
answer or there is a 50/50 split. That is, all the players
score 1
4
on just those occasions when there would be no
winner in a minority game.
The overall game is a combination of these two games.
The players do not know beforehand whether the pay-
off matrix will be that of the minority game or that of
the anti-minority game. (The way it is selected will be
described shortly.) The players are allowed to meet pri-
vately before the game to agree on a joint strategy and, if
they wish, prepare physical resources (classical or quan-
tum) for each of them to bring with them to the game.
The players are subsequently isolated and prevented from
communicating for the rest of the game. An impartial ref-
eree (someone other than the players) then asks each of
the isolated players one of two questions: either, “What
is the value of X?” or, “What is the value of Z?” to
which the player must respond with either +1 or −1 as
she chooses. Each player may, if she wishes, use whatever
physical resource she brought with her to aid in answer-
ing her question [25]. The game being played (minority
or anti-minority)—and thus the payoff matrix—is deter-
mined by the set of questions asked by the referee. If
the referee has asked three of the players for the value
of Z and one of the players for the value of X , then the
players are playing the minority game, and the payoff
matrix is the same as for the standard minority game
(independent of which player has been asked which par-
ticular question). If the referee asks three of the players
for the value of X and one player for the value of Z, then
the payoff matrix is that of the anti-minority game. The
referee has chosen the question list uniformly at random
from the following chart before the game begins:
X1Z2Z3Z4
Z1X2Z3Z4
Z1Z2X3Z4
Z1Z2Z3X4

 minority game;
Z1X2X3X4
X1Z2X3X4
X1X2Z3X4
X1X2X3Z4

 anti-minority game.
Thus, each of these lists has probability 1
8
of being asked
by the referee. Other question lists (such as Z1Z2X3X4
or X1X2X3X4) are promised not to be used. Notice that
once the payoff matrix is fixed (by the total number of
each question asked), there is no further dependence on
which player was asked which question, with the payoff
determined entirely by the players’ answers (of ±1).
The list X1Z2Z3Z4, for instance, represents player 1
being asked for the value of X and players 2–4 being
asked for the value of Z. According to the chart, this
corresponds to the minority game. Now let’s say, for
example, that player 3 answers +1, while players 1, 2,
and 4 answer −1. Then player 3 receives a payoff of 1,
and the others receive nothing. It does not matter which
question player 3 was asked (in this case, “What is the
value of Z?”), only that his answer (+1) is different from
the others’ (−1) and that the game being played (as de-
termined by all four questions together) is the minority
game.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME
In devising a strategy for this overall game, the chal-
lenge, of course, is that the players don’t know a pri-
ori whether they are playing the (competitive) minority
game or the (cooperative) anti-minority game. Since all
eight possibilities have equal probabilities, the two games
are equally likely.
The players gain partial information about the game
being played, however, once they receive their individ-
ual questions. If player 2, for example, is asked for
the value of X , then he knows that only four possi-
ble question lists remain: Z1X2X3X4, X1X2Z3X4, and
3X1X2X3Z4, which correspond to the anti-minority game,
as well as Z1X2Z3Z4, which corresponds to the minor-
ity game. This means that if a player is asked for the
value of X , he will believe himself to be playing the anti-
minority game with 75% certainty and the minority game
with 25% certainty. Similarly, being asked for the value
of Z will reverse these probabilities: 75% for the minority
game, 25% for the anti-minority game.
In principle, the players can use this information when
devising their strategies. Notice that in all cases, one
player will “get it wrong” in that she will only assign
25% to the actual game being played. One might suspect
that, especially if the actual game being played is the
minority game, which is competitive, this asymmetry in
information about the game could be used by the other
three players to ensure that the odd player out is never
allowed to win. We have not proven this; we only use
it to illustrate the fact that since a competitive game is
never completely ruled out for any player, the strategic
analysis is nontrivial.
IV. BOUNDS ON EXPECTED PAYOFF
REGARDLESS OF STRATEGY
At this point, it is useful to examine the bounds on a
player’s expected payoff regardless of strategy. Whether
such a payoff is achievable by any particular strategy
is a separate—and important—question that will be ad-
dressed shortly. But there are a few things that can be
stated about the game that must hold for any strategy:
1. The maximum total expected payoff (sum
for all players) is 1. This bound is saturated
if and only if the players can guarantee that they
will always produce a win condition when asked any
of the eight possible question lists.
2. If there exists a Nash-equilibrium strategy
that achieves a given total expected pay-
off, then there also exists a symmetric Nash
equilibrium [26] at that total expected pay-
off. There is nothing to distinguish the players
before the game begins—they all have the same in-
formation, and they all factor into the game in the
same way. Thus, if the payoffs differ for different
players using a given Nash-equilibrium strategy S,
then a correlated strategy that permutes the play-
ers’ labels in a uniformly random fashion (using,
for example, resources shared before the game) and
then employs S is necessarily a symmetric Nash
equilibrium with the same total expected payoff.
3. The maximum symmetric Nash-equilibrium
expected payoff for each player is 1
4
, which is
also Pareto optimal. This follows directly from
the two points above.
Note that in point (3) we are not claiming that this opti-
mal payoff is achievable. We show below, however, that
a strategy using quantum resources can be employed to
achieve an expected payoff of 1
4
for each player, and we
subsequently show this strategy to be a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, by point (3), this quantum strategy truly is Pareto
optimal and overall “the best the players can do” for this
game. Following this, we show that any strategy limited
to classical resources—i.e., those whose statistical prop-
erties can be reproduced using a local hidden variable
model—always performs strictly worse than this, thus
demonstrating that quantum resources are required for
achieving the optimal outcome.
V. STABILIZER FORMALISM
We can use the stabilizer formalism to create a strat-
egy using quantum resources that achieves the Pareto-
optimal payoff of 1
4
for each player. The strategy in-
volves the players preparing a four-qubit entangled quan-
tum state, one qubit of which is taken by each player to
be used during the game. Players each make projective
measurements on their system in accord with the ques-
tion asked (X or Z) and record ±1 in accord with the
result. The win conditions for the two possible games can
be seen to be mutually exclusive and based on the prod-
uct of the players’ answers: −1 for the minority game,
+1 for the anti-minority game.
A stabilizer state is defined as the +1-eigenstate of a
set of commuting observables. The set of all such ob-
servables is called the stabilizer of the state [23]. In or-
der for the players to guarantee a win in the cases where
the minority game is being played, measurements made
in accord with the questions asked must always multi-
ply to −1. Such a state is stabilized by the following
four operators: −X1Z2Z3Z4, −Z1X2Z3Z4, −Z1Z2X3Z4,
and −Z1Z2Z3X4. Notice that these operators commute.
Therefore they form a valid set of generators of a stabi-
lizer group, which specifies a unique pure state
|ψ〉〈ψ| =
(
I −X1Z2Z3Z4
2
)(
I − Z1X2Z3Z4
2
)
(2)
×
(
I − Z1Z2X3Z4
2
)(
I − Z1Z2Z3X4
2
)
.
The state |ψ〉 guarantees that there is a winner in each of
the four minority games, no matter which of these four
versions is played. This state is locally equivalent to the
four-qubit cat state.
The full stabilizer contains more than the four op-
erators listed above. It also contains all products of
these four operators. Multiplying together all choices of
three of these four operators reveals the following four
operators to also be part of the stabilizer: Z1X2X3X4,
X1Z2X3X4, X1X2Z3X4, and X1X2X3Z4. These corre-
spond to ensuring that the players’ answers multiply to
+1 for each of the four variants of the anti-minority game.
Thus, the state |ψ〉 also guarantees the players win if the
anti-minority game is played.
4No matter which of the eight question lists is asked,
making measurements in accord with the questions on
the state |ψ〉 guarantees that there is a winner for each
of them. Furthermore, the state is symmetric under per-
mutation of the players’ labels, so each player’s expected
payoff is 1
4
when this quantum strategy is used.
VI. PROOF OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We now prove that this quantum strategy is a Nash
equilibrium. To do this, we must show that no player can
do better by unilaterally choosing to do something other
than make a projective measurement in accord with his
question (X or Z) on the jointly prepared state |ψ〉 from
Eq. (2). What are the alternatives? Since he must answer
with one of two possible responses (±1), the most general
measurement he can perform is a two-outcome positive-
operator-valued measurement (POVM) [23]. This is
more general than a projective measurement, but in the
two-outcome case it is equivalent to adding bias and noise
to such a measurement and can be simulated with classi-
cal randomness [27]. Thus, we will only consider projec-
tive measurements as the possible alternative strategies
for the player (since adding bias and noise will only re-
duce his expected payoff).
Instead of starting directly with |ψ〉, the players pre-
pare for themselves the initial state |ψin〉 = (|0000〉 −
i|1111〉)/√2. We now define the unitary operation [28]
sˆ =
i√
2
(Yˆ + Zˆ) =
i√
2
(
1 −i
i −1
)
, (3)
which satisfies sˆ ⊗ sˆ ⊗ sˆ ⊗ sˆ|ψin〉 = |ψ〉. Now we can
demonstrate that the strategy of each player applying sˆ
to his qubit, measuring according to the question asked
(X or Z), and reporting the corresponding result is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that the first three players choose to follow
this strategy, while the fourth, D, elects to measure in
a different basis, which could depend on which question
she is asked. Without loss of generality, this is equiva-
lent to acting with a question-dependent unitary sˆX or sˆZ
followed by a projective measurement of X or Z, respec-
tively. Any such unitary operator may be parameterized
in general (up to an overall phase) by
Mˆ(θ, α, β) =
(
eiα cos θ
2
ieiβ sin θ
2
ie−iβ sin θ
2
e−iα cos θ
2
)
, (4)
where θ ∈ [0, pi], and α, β ∈ (−pi, pi]. Note that sˆ =
Mˆ(pi
2
, pi
2
,−pi
2
). We can calculate the expected payoff forD
for each of the question lists that could be asked of the
players. Interestingly, the payoff does not depend on the
game being played but rather only on the question thatD
is asked. If she is asked for Z, then
〈$D〉Z =
1
8
− 1
8
cos(α− β) sin θ, (5)
and if she is asked for X , then
〈$D〉X =
1
8
− 1
16
[
cos 2α(1 + cos θ) + cos 2β(1− cos θ)].
(6)
By inspection, Eqs. (5–6) both achieve their maximum
value of 〈$D〉 = 14 by the (non-unique) choice of θ =
α = −β = pi
2
, that is, by choosing sˆX = sˆZ = sˆ. Since
D cannot improve her payoff by a unilateral change of
strategy away from sˆ regardless of which of the games
is being played or which question she is asked, this is
her Nash-equilibrium strategy. By symmetry, the other
players also maximize their payoffs with the same strat-
egy. Indeed, by point (3) in the Section IV, an average
payoff of 1
4
for each player is the maximum possible and
therefore Pareto optimal.
VII. LOCAL HIDDEN VARIABLE MODEL
We now prove that no classical strategy (by which we
mean a strategy admitting a local hidden variable model)
can reproduce the quantum mechanical payoff. There are
many possible classical strategies that may be employed.
These include both mixed strategies, which have an ele-
ment of randomness, and pure strategies, which are de-
terministic. However, mixed strategies can be replaced
by corresponding pure strategies with all randomness rel-
egated to the classical resource prepared before the game.
The players meet before the game to prepare a clas-
sical resource to take with them to the game. This re-
source can be prepared stochastically, but the existence
of a local hidden-variable model (by assumption) guar-
antees that all statistical properties of the resource can
be modeled as arising from a joint probability distribu-
tion p(λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) over a set of definite, classical re-
sources {λi}. This means that at the end of the joint
meeting, each player will always come away with a defi-
nite classical resource λi, even if the particular resource
was chosen partially using coin flips and spins of roulette
wheels. This already introduces a source of stochasticity
into the problem, with deterministic preparation being a
special case.
Once at the game, each player is asked a question qi, af-
ter which each player must make a choice to either report
the answer +1 or to report −1. Each may use a mixed
strategy to do this. That is, each player can choose also
to bring with her coins for flipping and roulette wheels
for spinning after the question has been asked, in order
to help her make a decision of which value to report,
but this is redundant. The players know the possible
questions before the game starts, and the existence of
hidden variable models means that all probabilities may
be interpreted as lack of knowledge of the real state of
affairs of a system. Thus, each player can flip a coin
or spin a roulette wheel in the pre-game meeting and
record the outcomes for use in the game instead of gen-
erating these outcomes after the fact. Thus, all strate-
5gies for player i that involve stochastic dependence on
the classical resource λi (i.e., those which involve addi-
tional stochastic variables Ωi) can be simulated using a
strategy that depends deterministically on a new clas-
sical resource λ′i = (λi,Ωi). (Note that we drop the
prime in what follows.) Notice that the existence of a
local hidden-variable model for all statistical aspects of
the classical game is required for this replacement to be
made—it cannot in general be done when quantum re-
sources (specifically, certain entangled states) are used.
We can therefore consider each player’s strategy to
be defined by a function fi, which defines a pure strat-
egy such that the reply to the question qi is determined
by fi(λ, qi), which—in a slight abuse of notation—we
shorten to qi(λi) for clarity. By point (1) in Section IV,
simulating the Pareto-optimal Nash-equilibrium quan-
tum strategy where each player has an expected payoff of
1
4
requires that the players be able to guarantee a winner
in any of the eight cases that could be posed to them.
This condition can be written as a set of simultaneous
equations:
X1(λ1)Z2(λ2)Z3(λ3)Z4(λ4) = −1, (7a)
Z1(λ1)X2(λ2)Z3(λ3)Z4(λ4) = −1, (7b)
Z1(λ1)Z2(λ2)X3(λ3)Z4(λ4) = −1, (7c)
Z1(λ1)Z2(λ2)Z3(λ3)X4(λ4) = −1, (7d)
Z1(λ1)X2(λ2)X3(λ3)X4(λ4) = +1, (7e)
X1(λ1)Z2(λ2)X3(λ3)X4(λ4) = +1, (7f)
X1(λ1)X2(λ2)Z3(λ3)X4(λ4) = +1, (7g)
X1(λ1)X2(λ2)X3(λ3)Z4(λ4) = +1. (7h)
Since qi(λi) is a deterministic function, it must take on
a single value regardless of which equation it appears in.
Straightforward calculation reveals that there is no solu-
tion to these equations. For instance, since each function
must return ±1, multiplying equations (a), (b), and (c)
gives
X1(λ1)X2(λ2)X3(λ3)Z4(λ4) = −1,
in direct contradiction to (h). Hence, no classical re-
source (either deterministic or stochastic, using the ar-
gument above) can be prepared that guarantees there
is always a winner of each possible game. This means
that, using only classical resources, 〈$〉 < 1
4
, where the
inequality is strict. Thus, there is no classical strategy
which reproduces the result that can be achieved using
quantum resources.
VIII. BOUNDS ON EXPECTED PAYOFF
USING ONLY CLASSICAL RESOURCES
Having proved the main point of the paper, we could
stop there, but we will instead go one step further by
demonstrating a finite gap between the maximum sym-
metric expected payoff of 1
4
in the quantum case and that
in the classical case. This bound will be derived indepen-
dently of any particular classical strategy used. It is thus
not known whether it is achievable or whether it is a Nash
equilibrium. The only purpose is to quantify how good
one could ever hope to do with only classical resources.
Consider first the fact that once a player has been
asked his question, the list of eight equations to be satis-
fied shrinks to four. These always have the form of three
instances of one game and one instance of the other. For
instance, if player 4 is asked for the value of Z, then
Eqs. (7d–g) are eliminated. Unfortunately, as shown in
the last section, the remaining four cannot be satisfied si-
multaneously. The two sets are exchanged if she is asked
for the value ofX , but this doesn’t help because Eqs. (7d–
g) have no solution either. The game is symmetric under
exchange of the players’ labels, so this applies to all play-
ers equally. Thus, once the players know their questions,
each of them is left with a (different) set of four simulta-
neously insoluble equations that cannot be ruled out.
Thus, it is not rational (even in the case of players
with very clever strategies!) for any player to believe that
there will always be a winner in each of the four cases he
must still consider. Thus, he is forced to conclude that
there will be no winner in at least one of those games,
even in the best possible scenario. The question he must
ask then is, Which win am I willing to sacrifice? The
answer, of course, depends on how well he expects to do
in each case.
Again, let’s push the envelope as far as we can, while
still remaining rational. There are two win conditions
that must be considered: a win of the anti-minority game
always pays 1
4
, while a win of the minority game has an
expected payoff anywhere between 0 and 1, since there
remains a question of which player is the winner. The
minority game win is thus the case that requires more
consideration. If a player considers the case where a mi-
nority game is being played, she knows that three players
have the same information (they have each been asked for
the value of Z), while one player has other information
(he has been asked for the value of X). Being rational,
the players who were asked Z must have equal expected
payoffsMZ , since there is nothing to distinguish between
them, but it need not be the same as the expected pay-
offMX of the player who was asked for X . Still, the total
payoff of the minority game is 1, so 3MZ+MX ≤ 1 when
the minority game is being considered. We are consider-
ing the best possible case for the players, so we choose to
saturate this bound and write
3MZ +MX = 1, (8)
since any other choice only reduces the players’ payoffs.
Notice that 0 ≤ MZ ≤ 13 , while 0 ≤ MX ≤ 1. The
upper bound of 1 on MX corresponds to the notion that
a very clever player might have a strategy that lets him
win every time the minority game is being played and he
is asked for X , while MZ is upper-bounded by
1
3
because
there are three players who are asked Z in the case of
a minority game, so the full payoff must have an equal
6chance of being obtained by any of them.
Let us consider now the case of a player who has been
asked for the value of X . There is now one possible way
that a minority game is being played and three possible
ways that an anti-minority game is being played. She
knows that she cannot guarantee a win in all four cases,
yet each is equally likely. She now has to choose between
allowing a loss (for all players) in the minority game and
allowing a loss in one of the anti-minority games. Sacri-
ficing the minority game gives an expected payoff of
〈$〉X,m =
3
4
1
4
+
1
4
0 =
3
16
, (9)
while sacrificing one of the three anti-minority games
gives
〈$〉X,a =
3
4
2
3
1
4
+
1
4
MX =
1 + 2MX
8
. (10)
For this case, which game to sacrifice depends on the
expected payoffMX in the case of a win condition in the
minority game. When MX >
1
4
, then 〈$〉X,a > 〈$〉X,m,
and the player is better off using a strategy that sacrifices
the win in the minority game. However, when MX <
1
4
,
the player is better off sacrificing one of the anti-minority
game wins.
Similarly, if a player is asked for the value of Z, there
are three possible ways that the minority game is being
played and only one possible way that the anti-minority
game is being played, each again being equally likely. He
must choose which one to allow a loss in. Sacrificing one
of the minority games gives
〈$〉Z,m =
1
4
1
4
+
3
4
2
3
MZ =
1 + 8MZ
16
=
11− 8MX
48
, (11)
where we have used (8) in the last equality. Instead,
sacrificing the anti-minority game gives
〈$〉Z,a =
1
4
0 +
3
4
MZ =
3MZ
4
=
1−MX
4
. (12)
Once again, the cross-over point between the two occurs
when MX =
1
4
, with a sacrifice of the minority game
preferred whenMX <
1
4
and sacrificing the anti-minority
game preferred when MX >
1
4
.
The overall expected payoff is an average of the two
optimal payoffs. We consider the two cases of MX sepa-
rately. When MX <
1
4
, then
max 〈$〉 = 1
2
〈$〉X,m +
1
2
〈$〉Z,m =
7− 4MX
32
. (13)
Similarly, when MX >
1
4
, then
max 〈$〉 = 1
2
〈$〉X,a +
1
2
〈$〉Z,a =
17 + 4MX
96
. (14)
Recalling the bounds onMX , pluggingMX = 0 into (13)
and plugging MX = 1 into (14) both give
max 〈$〉
classical
=
7
32
. (15)
Once again, we have not shown that this is achievable by
any particular strategy nor that such a strategy is a Nash
equilibrium. However, if a symmetric Nash-equilibrium
strategy is to exist for this game under the restriction
that the players only use classical resources, the best any
player can hope for is an expected payoff of 7
32
, instead
of 1
4
using quantum resources.
IX. CONCLUSION
By selecting either a minority or anti-minority game
and choosing one of four measurement bases in each case,
we have constructed a competitive game with an aver-
age Nash-equilibrium payoff that is also Pareto optimal.
There is no classical prescription—that is, a set of values
for measurements of Xi and Zi—that can produce a win-
ner in all four minority and all four anti-minority games.
Thus, no classical strategy, even allowing for initial classi-
cal communication amongst the players, can achieve the
payoff that we have demonstrated using quantum entan-
glement. The best conceivable average payoff using only
classical resources is only 7
8
of that achievable by dis-
tributing an entangled quantum state amongst the play-
ers.
Although this game is somewhat contrived, it answers
the two main criticisms of quantum games presented in
Ref. 7: (1) that the “quantum solution” to a classical
game does not faithfully solve the original classical game,
and (2) that the quantum solution can also be obtained
through classical means. Our responses follow. We also
address the “side issue” presented in that paper involv-
ing the cooperative aspect of games, which we discuss
separately below.
In response to the first objection, the quantum and
classical versions of the game we consider are identical
except for the resources that are available to the players
in each case. In the end, each player must produce a defi-
nite classical answer (±1) for the referee, even if quantum
resources were used to make the decision—i.e., the play-
ers answer with bits, not qubits. This looks to be as close
as one could possibly get to a “minimal generalization” of
a classical game to a quantum one: simply replace classi-
cal resources with quantum ones while requiring the same
rules and interactions with the referee. This generaliza-
tion from classical to quantum is more conservative than
the “standard” method of quantizing a classical game
presented in Ref. 1 since the quantum resources (if any)
possessed by each player can only be manipulated locally
before a classical answer is produced. As such, many of
the objections to the method of Ref. 1 do not apply to
our game. The second objection is addressed directly in
Section VIII, where we prove that players of our game
perform strictly better when they are able to use quan-
tum resources than when they are restricted to classical
ones.
It is worth noting that the only difference between
the games we consider is whether the players are ca-
7pable of using quantum resources in addition to classi-
cal ones or not. All other aspects of the game—such as
the availability of correlated randomness, the ability to
make (and break!) agreements, etc.—remain unchanged.
In fact, the inability to use quantum resources can be
framed in physical terms as, for example, ignorance of
the fact that the world is quantum mechanical (e.g., if
the game were played in the year 1900) or insufficient
technical expertise in preparing and manipulating quan-
tum resources. This means that we really just have one
game that we are analyzing, with the two “versions” of it
arising simply from two different scenarios regarding the
knowledge and abilities of the players.
The final issue in Ref. 7 is whether the quantum ver-
sion of a classical game has made an inherently non-
cooperative game into a game with a cooperative aspect.
Our response is that the degree to which our game is,
respectively, “cooperative” and “competitive” does not
change when comparing the classical and quantum ver-
sions since the game itself has not changed. It is worth
emphasizing a related point, however: the issue of com-
petition. The implied skepticism in Ref. 7 about whether
entanglement can help the players improve their payoff in
a wholly noncooperative game is well taken, and we note
that it is the uncertainty in whether it is best to compete
or cooperate that appears to make the improvement pos-
sible in the case we consider. While our game retains a
cooperative aspect, it also involves competition between
the players. This is the key feature that distinguishes
it from others in the literature that are wholly cooper-
ative [13, 14]: entangled quantum resources assist the
players in improving their expected payoff in a competi-
tive setting. Thus, one might conjecture that uncertainty
about cooperation/competition is a generic requirement
for allowing entanglement to assist with a competitive
game (beyond what is achievable using classical correla-
tions). We leave this question to further research.
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